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Defendant/Respondent
following

brief

in

opposition

Albert

Kienke,

submits

to

petition

for writ of

the

the

certiorari to the Supreme Court.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following questions are presented to this Court for
review:
1.

Whether the Utah Court of Appeals departed from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it upheld
the ruling of the trial court that the decedent was responsible
for the dangerous condition he created.
2.

Whether the ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals

conflicts with

the decisions of this Court in holding that

because the defendant was not negligent as a matter of law, the
Court need not rule on the issue of statutory employment.

OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
On May

10, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a

unanimous decision, issued its opinion affirming the entry of
summary judgment in favor of Albert Kienke.

Plaintiff filed a

Petition for Rehearing. On June 2, 1989, the Utah Court of
Appeals issued an order denying the Petition for Rehearing.

-1-

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
The
jurisdiction

petitioner
to

hear

has

this

asserted

Petition

that

for

this

Writ

of

Court

has

Certiorari

pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court,

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
This Court's interpretation of the following statute
is pertinent to the determination of the issues presented for
review.

Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-57 (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of the decision by the Utah Court of

Appeals which affirmed a summary judgment by the trial court
dismissing the plaintiff's wrongful death action.

Plaintiff's

decedent, Robert English, was rebuilding the front porch of the
house he was renting from the defendant.

He had removed the

columns which held up the roof of the porch and had put temporary
supports in their place.

When the supports gave way the roof

fell on him and he sustained injuries which resulted in his
death.

-2-

The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the landowner,
Albert

Kienke,

was

negligent.

Plaintiff's

complaint

also

alleged that Mr. Kienke was Mr. English's employer under the
Workers1

Compensation

Mr. Kienkefs

alleged

Act

and

"knowing

sought

punitive

damages

for

and reckless disregard for the

safety of plaintiff's deceased."
2.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
Following substantial discovery efforts by both parties

including

structural design studies by the parties1 experts,

defendant

brought

his

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment,

and

in

response, plaintiff filed his Counter-motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
entered

On August 31, 1987, the Honorable David S. Young
the

Court's

Memorandum

Decision

in

favor

of

the

defendant; and on September 4, 1987, the Court entered its Order
awarding

defendant

Summary

Judgment

and

denying

plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff appealed the decision of the District Court.
On May 10, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Motion
for Summary Judgment in favor of Mr. Kienke.

Plaintiff filed a

Petition for Rehearing which was denied by the Utah Court of
Appeals in an Order issued June 2, 1989.
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3.

Statement of Relevant Facts
The

petitioner's

"Statement

of

Relevant

Facts"

is

argumentive, conclusory, misleading and without support in the
record.

The petitioner has mischaracterized the facts as set

forth in his trial court brief and his brief to the Court of
Appeals.

Paragraphs 1 and 3 refer to documents that are not in

the record.
Albert

Paragraph 9 refers to a nonexistent page 131 in

Kienke!s

deposition.

Paragraph

11

cites

merely

to

appellant's prior Summary Judgment Brief and not to any evidence
in the records.
The uncontroverted facts are as follows:
1.

Albert Kienke has worked for the Utah Department of

Transportation for the last 25 years as a land acquisition agent.
He has a part-time business as a small landowner.

(Deposition of

Albert Kienke, Record at 269, pp. 4-6, 14-16).
2.

Defendant, Albert Kienke, and his wife were the

joint owners of a house located at 1031 Windsor Street in Salt
Lake City, Utah. (Id. at p. 3).
3.

In December, 1984, the house was

extensive repairs.

in need of

There was a hole in the ceiling, holes in the

doors, kitchen cabinet doors needed to be rehung, the carpet
needed to be replaced and the front porch needed work. (Id. at
pp. 38-42).
-4-

4.

The ceiling inside the front porch was in poor

shape and one beam on the north side of the front porch was
sagging considerably.

The roof of the porch was supported by big

columns which needed paint but other than that, there was nothing
wrong with them. (Id. at p. 42).
5.

Robert English was born on March 18, 1957.

28 years of age at the time of his death.

He was

(Deposition of Daniel

English, Record at 267, p. 4).
6.

Robert English was a graduate

University of Utah at the time of his death.

student at the
(Record at 146,

148).
7.

In

January

of

1985 Robert English

Mr. Kienke to ask him if he had a place to rent.

telephoned
Mr. Kienke

responded that the only place that was vacant was the house at
1031 Windsor which needed "an awful lot of repairs."
said that he was interested in doing the repairs.

Mr. English

(Deposition of

Albert Kienke, Record at 269, pp. 44-46).
8.

Mr. Kienke met Mr. English at the Windsor Street

house in January, 1985.

Mr. English said he needed a place to

rent but he didn't have a lot of money.
place needed a lot of work.

Mr. Kienke said the

Mr. English asked if he could do the

work in exchange for the rent.

Mr. Kienke agreed. (Iji. at pp.

46-47).
-5-

9.

Mr. Kienke showed Mr. English the property and

pointed out what repairs were needed, including a new plywood
floor, new linoleum in the kitchen, new kitchen cabinets, a new
floor and linoleum in the bathroom, paint in the kitchen, paint
on the outside and repair work on the ceiling of the front porch.
(Id. at pp. 48-52).
10.

The front porch seemed solid but Mr. English

suggested that he could repair the bottoms of the posts on the
two outside corners of the porch and that he could repair a
couple of loose boards on the steps. (Id. at pp. 52-54).
11.

Mr. English drew up all of the plans for repairs

and submitted them to Mr. Kienke for approval.

(Id. at pp. 55-

57).
12.
giving

Mr.

Mr. Kienke paid for the materials used by either
English

Mr. English later.

checks

in

advance,

(Id. at p. 57).

or

by

reimbursing

Mr. Kienke occasionally

supplied materials himself. (Id. at pp. 60-62).
13.

Mr. English planned the work himself, and did the

work on his own.

Mr. Kienke testified:

Well, he wanted to do it all and plan it. So
I just left him alone and let him do it
because he was doing it. He was in charge of
it, and he was doing it.
(Id. at p. 56).
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14.

Mr. English did all of the work himself except

that Mr. Kienke made a jam for the back door which Mr. English
installed. (Id. at p. 58).
15.

During the time that Mr. English was working on

the house, Mr. Kienke would not see Mr. English for a month or
two at a time. (Id. at p. 62).
16.
Mr. English

The
regarding

only
the

instructions

Mr.

repairs

that he wanted

were

Kienke

gave

to
good

quality work done, but not to go overboard on the expense,
because it was a rental unit. (Id. at pp. 55-60).
17.

Mr. English provided most of his own hand tools

but borrowed a power Skil saw, a shovel, a tub to mix cement and
a roof jack from Mr. Kienke. (Id. at pp. 66, 67).
18.

Before Mr. English began to work on the porch he

told Mr. Kienke that he was going to replace the two posts on
each end of the porch and pour cement footings for the posts.
Mr. Kienke told Mr. English not to do any more than he had to,
but mainly repair the porch ceiling, repair the sagging beam on
the north said of the porch and install some planks on the floor.
(Id. at pp. 68-70).
19.

In

December,

1985,

Mr.

English

telephoned

Mr. Kienke and said he wanted Mr. Kienke to see what he had done
on the porch.

Mr. Kienke went to the house and was shocked to
-7-

find that the whole lower part of the porch, the decking, the
steps and the sub-beams had been removed.

All that remained was

the roof of the porch and the three columns which Mr. English had
supported with cement blocks. (Id. at pp. 71-23).
20.

Mr. Kienke told Mr. English to be certain to have

plenty of two-by-fours at the sides of the porch to support the
ceiling.

Mr. English told Mr. Kienke how he was going to build

the porch and his plans appeared adequate to Mr. Kienke. (Id. at
p. 74).
21.

On January 4, 1986, the roof of the porch fell

from its temporary supports onto Mr. English, causing his death.
(Complaint, Record at p. 3, paragraph 2).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of

the trial court based on sound judicial precedent and in doing
so, did not depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings.

Albert Kienke was under no duty to warn his tenant,

Robert English, of risks that were known to Mr. English or were
so obvious and apparent that Mr. English could reasonably be
expected to discover them.

The alleged dangerous condition,

i.e., the inadequate support for the porch roof was not only

-8-

obvious

and

apparent

to

Mr.

English,

it

was

created

by

Mr. English.
2.

The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals does not

conflict with

the decisions of this Court in upholding the

Summary Judgment.
consistent

with

statutory law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was
both

prior

decisions

of

this

Court

and

Both the case law and the Workers' Compensation

Act agree that because as a matter of law Mr. Kienke was not
negligent, the Court need not rule on whether Mr. Kienke was
Mr. English's employer.

ARGUMENT
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court states
that:
[r]eview by a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons.
Therefore,
the following, while neither controlling nor
wholely measuring the Court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons that will
be considered:
. . .

(2)
when a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state or
federal law in a way that is in conflict with
the decision of this Court;
(3) when a panel of the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision that has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanction such a departure by a lower court as
-9-

to call for an exercise of this Court's power
of supervision.
Neither

of

the

two

grounds

petitioner applies to this cas<w •
the

ruling

of

the

Court

of

for

review

alleged

by

There is ample precedence for

Appeals.

In

addition,

bare

contentions unsupported in the record raise no material issue of
fact so as to preclude the entry of Summary Judgment.
Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980).

Massey v.

Petitioner cannot

charge the Court of Appeals with departure from judicial practice
simply because it did not accept petitioner's unsupported version
of the facts.

Robert English created the risk himself when he

removed the support posts and replaced them with a stack of
cement blocks.

Albert Kienke was thus under no duty to warn

Robert English of dangers which were known to him or which were
so obvious and apparent that he may reasonably have been expected
to discover them.

POiNT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ON SOUND JUDICIAL
PRECEDENT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DECEDENT WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DANGEROUS CONDITION HE
CREATED.
The

uncontroverted

deposition

testimony

of

Albert

Kienke establishes that the condition of the porch which resulted
in its collapse in the death of Robert English was not created by
-10-

any actions or inaction on the part of Albert Kienke but was
created solely by the actions of the decedent, Robert English.
Prior to Mr. English's work on the porch, the ceiling and one
beam on the north side of the porch were in disrepair but the
columns

which

supported

the

porch

were

strong

and

stable.

Mr. English took it upon himself to remove those columns and to
place the roof supports
roof.

on temporary blocks to hold up the porch

It was while the porch was in this condition that the

supports gave way and the roof fell on Mr. English resulting in
his death.
The plaintiff

contends

that Mr. Kienke

negligently

allowed the porch to exist in dangerous condition, thereby,
resulting in the death of Robert English.

The law in Utah is

clear that a landowner owes no duty to warn an invitee of a
danger which is known

to the invitee or which is obvious.

In

Moore v. Burton Lumber and Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 868 (Utah
1981), this Court stated the rule as follows:
It has long been held that a property owner
has no obligation to warn an invitee of
dangers which are known to the invitee or
which are so obvious and apparent that he may
be reasonably be expected to discover them.
In Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978).

The

defendant's horse became entangled in a chain because of the
defendant's alleged negligence in the manner of which the horse
-11-

was tied to the post.

At the defendant's request the plaintiff

attempted to disentangle the horse and in doing so the plaintiff
was trampled by the horse.

The plaintiff brought suit against

the defendant in the manner in which the horse was tied.

The

Court upheld a summary judgment in favor of the defendant saying:
Where there is a dangerous condition on one's
property, which is just as observable to an
invitee as to the owner, the owner has no
duty to warn or the protect the invitee
except to observe the universal standard of
reasonable care under the circumstances. Let
it be assumed that the manner in which the
horse was tied was negligent and that this
created
a dangerous condition.
When
plaintiff came there, whatever negligence
existed in that regard had come to rest.
There is nothing whatsoever to indicate that
the defendant failed in any duty to exercise
care for the plaintiff's safety after the
latter entered the premises.
He had the
freedom of choice and opportunity to avoid
any injury to himself.
In the present case the dangerous condition, i.e., the
manner in which the porch roof was supported, not only was it
apparent to the plaintiff's decedent as to tne defendant, but the
condition was created by the plaintiff's decedent.

Under Utah

law a tenant is liable for a dangerous condition created by him.
In Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d
Supreme Court ^uled that:
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567 (Utah 1978), the Utah

"It is the tenant who is liable for any
dangerous condition on the premises which he
creates or permits to come into existence
after he has taken possession."
Stephenson, at 568 quoting Restatement of Torts Section 355.
Mr. English retained the freedom and opportunity to
avoid injury and Mr. Kienke as landowner certainly cannot be held
liable for

conditions which he not only did not create but which

were created by the injured party.
In order to support the claim that the ruling by the
trial court was improper, petitioner has mischaracterized facts
contrary

to what

is actually

on

the record.

For example,

petitioner describes Mr. Kienke as being "actively involved" in
Mr. English's repairs even though it is clear from the record he
was rarely involved in the project at all.

Petitioner also

continues to refer to the decedent as to Mr. Kienke's "employee"
despite the lack of support in the record and the ruling by the
trial court that Mr. English was an independent contractor.
In addition to misrepresenting the facts, petitioner
has either mischaracterized or simply misunderstood the opinion
of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals

found that the decedent was liable for the risks he created
merely because he did the "hand-ons" work in the project.

A

careful reading of the Court's opinion, however, reveals that the
Court of Appeals based its decision on Stephenson v. Warner,
-13-

supra, in which this Court held that the tenant who creates a
dangerous condition is responsible for his injury.

Such a ruling

accurately reflects the facts and circumstances of this case.
Despite the efforts of petitioner to raise issues of
material fact or problems with the ruling of the Court of Appeals
there

is

simply

nothing

which

could

be

characterized

as a

departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings, and thus
nothing in the opinion of the Court of Appeals which would merit
review by this Court.

POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ITS
FOUNDATION
IN BOTH THE UTAH WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT AND IN UTAH CASE LAW, AND
DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE DECISION OF THIS
COURT.
The

trial

court

found

that Robert

English was an

independent contractor and was not an employee of Mr. Kienke.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that Mr. Kienke was
Mr. English's employer, Mr. Kienke would still not be liable for
Mr. English's injuries.
Section 35-1-57 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act
states:
[e]mployers who shall fail to comply with the
provisions of Section 35-1-46 shall not be
entitled to the benefits of this title during
the period of noncompliance, but shall be
-14-

liable in a civil action to their employees
for damages suffered by reason of personal
injuries arising out of or in the course of
employment caused by the wrongful act,
neglect or default of the employer or any of
the employer's officers, agents or employees
and also to the defendant's personal
representatives if such employees where death
results from such injuries . . . Proof of the
injury shall constitute prima facie evidence
of negligence on the part of the employer and
the burden shall be upon the employer to show
freedom from negligence resulting in such
injuries.
Because Mr. Kienke has met this burden and proven that
as a matter of law he was free

from negligence, the issue of

whether he was Mr. English's employer has become moot under the
statute.

This view is supported by Peterson v. Sorensen, 65 P.2d

12 (Utah 1937), which was cited by the Court of Appeals.

In

Peterson this Court said that:
"[t]here
is nothing in the Workmen's
Compensation Act which justifies plaintiff in
recovery in either for negligence not
charged, or for negligence charged but not
proven."
The issue of whether Mr. Kienke was the employer of
Mr. English

is

now

irrelevant

negligent as a matter of law.

because

Mr.

Kienke

was

not

This ruling by the Court of

Appeals has the support of both the Utah Workers' Compensation
Statute and a prior decision of this Court.

Because the ruling

in no way conflicts with a prior decision by this Court, it thus
cannot serve as a basis for review by certiorari.
-15-

CONCLUSION
The

alleged

dangerous

condition

which

resulted

in

Mr. E glish's death, the inadequate support for the porch roof,
was not only open and obvious to Mr. English, it was created by
him.

Albert Kienke was thus under no duty to warn Mr. English of

an obvious risk.
*~he ruling

by

There is ample precedent in Utah law to support
the

Court

of

Appeals

affirming

the

summary

judgment of the trial court, and thus the decision in no way
departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings so as to
justify review of certiorari by this Court.

The decision of the

Utah Court of Appeals does not conflict with a decision of this
Court in finding that because Mr. Kienke was not negligent as a
matter of law, it need not reach the issue of whether he was the
employer of Mr. English.

The decision of the Court of Appeals

was totally consistent with prior decisions of this Court and
with statutory law and thus does not merit review of certiorari
by this Court.
DATED this J ^

day of

s^^^r

,

1989.

r
AARON ALMA NELSON/Esq.
of and for
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
Counsel for Defendant/Respondent
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APPENDIX A

LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Section 35-1-42

35-1-42. Employer* enumerated and defined—Regularly employed—Independent contractors.—The following shall constitute employers subject
to the provisions of this title:
(1) The state, and each county, city, town and school district therein.
(2) lavery person, firm and private corporation, including every public utility, having in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly
employed in the same business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except
agricultural laborers and domestic servants; provided, that employers
of agricultural laborers and domestic servants, shall have the right to come
under the terms of "ciis tiua by complying with the provisions thereof and
the rules and regulations of the commission.
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all employments in
the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of
the year*
"Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part
for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work Is a part or process in the trade or business of the
employer, such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any such subcontractors, shall he deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees
of such original employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged in
xhe performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed
an employer within the meaning of this section- The term "independent
contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any person, association or
corporation engaged in the performance of any work for another, who,
while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains to
the execution of the work, is not subject to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of
work^ and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in
accordance with the employer's design.
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This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the District
Court herein be, and the same is, affirmed.
Opinion of the Court by RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge; REGNAL W.
GARFF and GREGORY K. ORME, Judges, concur.
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Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Orme.
BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals entry of summary judgment for defendant in
a wrongful death action. We affirm, finding no error in the
trial courtfs determination that plaintiff's decedent was liable
as a matter of law for the dangerous condition which he created
and which resulted in his death.
On January 4, 1986, 28-year-old graduate student Robert
English was killed in a tragic accident while rebuilding the
front porch of his leased house at 1031 Windsor Street, Salt
Lake City. Temporary supports placed under the roof of the
porch by the decedent gave way, causing the roof to fall onto
him.
Plaintiff Daniel English, personal representative of
decedent's estate, filed a negligence action against the
property owner, defendant Albert Kienke. The record shows that
defendant, by oral agreement, permitted the decedent to live in

the house rent-free in exchange for decedent's labor in making
repairs to the house. Although defendant had told decedent the
front porch needed repair, decedent planned and executed the
work himself, and defendant supplied or paid for the materials.
Plaintiff filed two motions for partial summary judgment on
the issue of whether an employee-employer relationship existed
between the parties, and defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment. In a memorandum decision, the district court found
that the decedent had created the dangerous condition which
killed him, and that he was an "independent contractor" under
workers' compensation law. The trial court entered summary
judgment for defendant and denied plaintiff's motions.
Plaintiff claims on appeal that entry of summary judgment
for defendant is in error, contending that there are unresolved
factual issues involving the reasonableness of the risk of harm
and whether the dangerous condition of the porch was within
defendant's knowledge. Plaintiff notes that "[w]hether an
unreasonable risk of harm exist[s] is a determination of fact to
be made by the jury." Wagoner v. Waterslide Inc.. 744 P.2d
1012, 1013 (Utah App. 1987).
Summary judgment may be granted whenever the trial court
determines that "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Our analytical standard
for review of a summary judgment is the same as that of the
trial court: we review the facts and inferences from those
facts in the light most favorable to the losing party. SsJLtal
v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah App. 1989). If we
conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the
summary judgment will be overturned and the case remanded for
further proceedings on that issue. I&. Where no material facts
remain unresolved, we examine the trial court's conclusions of
law and review them for correctness. Bonham v. Morgan. 102 Utah
Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (1989) (per curiam).
We note that summary judgment should be granted with great
caution where negligence is alleged. Apache Tank Lines. Inc. v.
Cheney. 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985). This is because
"(ilssues of negligence ordinarily present questions of fact to
be resolved by the fact finder." Id. "It is only when the
facts are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be
drawn therefrom that such issues become questions of law." Id..
Accordingly, summary judgment is reserved for only the most
clear-cut negligence cases. Ingram v. Salt Lake Citv. 733 P.2d
126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam). Ssa, e^g., Webster v. Sill.
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) (summary judgment affirmed for
landlord where tenant was injured while mowing lawn in exchange
for rent reduction).

The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant,
relying on the holding of Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
R-R. Co.- 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 (1964). Steals, however,
was decided on the basis of the duty owed by a landowner to an
"invitee." This is consistent with the common law notion that
the duty of care owed to a person injured on another's property
depended on whether the injured party was classified as an
invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Gregory v. Fourthwest inv..
Ltd-., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988).
Utah has now abandoned these artificial common law
categories, and expanded the landlord's common law duty. Id.
It is, therefore, unnecessary to wrestle with the issue of
whether at the time of the accident decedent could best be
described as a "licensee" or "invitee." Rather, we now impose
upon landowners "a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their
tenants in all circumstances." Id. (quoting Williams v. Melbv.
699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985)). That duty of reasonable care
encompasses care to assure their property is "reasonably safe
and suitable for intended uses." Stephenson v. Warner. 581 P.2d
567, 568 (Utah 1978). Landowners may be liable for injuries
caused by dangerous conditions which they create, and which they
should reasonably foresee would expose others to an unreasonable
risk of harm. Id* Landowners are not liable, however, if
tenants fail to keep the premises "reasonably safe and in good
repair." Id. Moreover, tenants are liable for any dangerous
condition on the premises which they create or permit to come
into existence after they have taken possession. Id* at 568-69;
see generally. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 355 (1965).
In granting summary judgment to defendant, the trial court
apparently considered the pleadings, answers to defendant's
interrogatories, and the depositions of the parties.1 The
trial court then determined that "the decedent created the risk
by removing the foundational support for the porch," a
conclusion clearly supported by the record. It is clear that
decedent did all of the porch reconstruction himself, and was so
engaged when the accident occurred. It is also clear that
decedent placed temporary supports under the roof and did so
without the assistance of the defendant. None of these material
facts were disputed. Accordingly, only one reasonable
conclusion can be drawn—decedent created the dangerous
1. We can only presume that the trial court did not consider
other depositions in the record since the court never referred
to them and they were filed after the date of summary judgment.
Depositions not considered below may not be considered on
appeal. SSfi Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guar. Ins.
Underwriters. Inc.. 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P.2d 135 (1963);
Rosander v. Larsen. 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 146 (1962).

condition that caused his own death.
We find no error in the trial court's ruling that it was the
decedent, not the defendant, who was negligent as a matter of
law. steohenson established that the tenant who creates a
dangerous condition is responsible for his own injury. I£. at
568-69. Although the trial court did not cite sfceohenson as the
legal basis for its decision, we may affirm the trial court on
any proper legal basis. Berabe v. Fashion Centre. Ltd., 104
Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7 (1989); Tavlor v.ffsfrafceof Tavlor. 770 P.2d
163, 169 (Utah App. 1989).
Plaintiff further characterizes the relationship between
defendant and the decedent as one of employer-employee, and
claims that the trial court erred in finding otherwise.
Plaintiff seeks resolution of this issue in his favor in order
to impose a statutory duty upon defendant to provide a safe
workplace. fifls Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-12 (1988). If defendant
was deemed to be an employer and failed to secure workers'
compensation protection for the decedent, plaintiff could also
seek certain statutory penalties against defendant. Saa Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-57 (permitting civil actions by injured
employees against such employers where injury is "caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer"). Since it is
conclusive as a matter of law, however, that decedent, not
defendant, was the negligent party, we need not reach the issue
of statutory employment. S&& Peterson v. Sorensen. 91 Utah 507,
65 P.2d 12, 16 (1937) (noncompliance with workers' compensation
act does not justify recovery for negligence charged but not
proven).
Summary judgment for defendant is affirmed.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Appellant,
Case No. 880236-CA
Respondent

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Plaintiff/
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter,
and the Court having duly considered said petition.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff/Appellant's
Petition for Rehearing be denied.
Dated this 02nd day of June, 1989.
FOR THE COURT

Mary T/Noonan
Clerjybf the Court
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84101-1480
Aaron Alma Nelson
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
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1300 Continental Bank Building
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Allan L. Larson
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DATED this 05th day of June, 1989.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL ENGLISH, as Executor
:
of the Estate of ROBERT ENGLISH,
:
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-86-1792

vs.
ALBERT KIENKE,
Defendant*

The above-entitled matter came on for consideratior by the
Court on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court

heard the argument of the respective attorneys, and based upon
the arguments and the filed Memoranda, both in support, and in
opposition, the Court makes this its
MEMORANDUM DECISION
The Court finds that the provisions of Section 342 of the
Restatement of Torts, as discussed further in the case of steel
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Co.. 396 P.2d 751, 16 Utah
2d 127 (1964), require the Court to conclude that the Motion for
Summary Judgment on behalf of the defendant should be granted.
The Court finds that in the critical language related to the
requirements of a landowner to a licensee there must be met,
prior to liability, the following conditions:
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(a) The possessor knows or has reason to know of
the condition and should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should
expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, and
(b) He fails to exercise reasonable care to make
the condition safe, and/or to warn the licensee of the
condition and the risk involved, and
(c) The licensees do not know or have reason to
know of the condition and the risk involved.
The Court finds under the circumstances of this case that
reasonable minds could not differ in the obligation expected of
the defendant to recognize the risk.

First, the Court finds that

the

removing

decedent

created

the

risk

by

the

foundational

support for the porch, and second, that he did so without the
approval

of the defendant.

Certainly

the decedent would

be

charged with perceiving the risk at a level at least equal to or
greater than that required of the defendant.

When the defendant

came by the residential property and observed the changes created
by the decedent, the defendant had no greater responsibility to
perceive the risk than that of the decedent.
The

Court

cannot

find

that

the

defendant

should

have

realized that the circumstances involved a "unreasonable risk of
harm" to the licensee, and that the defendant

" . . .

should

expect that they [the decedent] will not discover or realize the
danger."

The Court cannot find that the defendant had a greater

responsibility

to

inform

the decedent

of

decedent should have perceived on his own.

the

risk than

the
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Further, the Court cannot find that the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, nor that the
decedent could not know, or have reason to know of the condition
and the relative risk.
Based

that

the

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

The

Court

upon

further

contractor,

the

finds

and

not

foregoing,

that
an

the

the

Court

decedent

employee

under

finds

was

an

the

independent

Utah

Workers

Compensation Act, and finally, based upon the foregoing, the
Court cannot find any basis upon which punitive damages could be
awarded.

Thus, the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted in each particular.
Dated this

3/

dav of August, 1987.

DAVID S./YOUNG
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL ENGLISH, as Executor
of the Estate of ROBERT
ENGLISH,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. C86-1792
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG

vs.
ALBERT KIENKE,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment duly came before this Court for hearing on
August 17, 1987, at 9:00 a.m.

Plaintiff appeared through his

attorney, Fred R. Silvester, and Defendant appeared through his
attorney, Aaron Alma Nelson.

Prior to the hearing both parties

submitted to the Court Memoranda which were reviewed by the Court.
The Court heard arguments by the parties and took the matter under
advisement.

The Court later issued its Memorandum Decision grant-

ing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court being fully

advised it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby awarded

Summary Judgment against Plaintiff.

DATED t h i s

M

day of

Sep-femb&T

, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

M

DAVID S. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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day of September,

1987, to:
Mr. Fred R. Silvester
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Co-Counsel for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

4^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby

certify

that

a true

and correct copy of the

foregoing Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari was mailed,
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